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THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
ABUSE PREVENTION ACT, THE STALKING
STATUTE, AND THE MARITAL RAPE EXEMPTION
ON VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC ABUSE
He threatenedmy life. He put 2 hands on my neck trying to choke me.
Then he put his hands on my left arm making a motion to twist it. Meanwhile
he said men are born to rule and men are the kings.... He went on lecturing
me on how to behave like a wife and a woman for 30 minutes. Then he
demandedsex.I
I. INTRODUCTION

Every year, domestic violence affects thousands of families resulting in
injury and sometimes death.2 Domestic abuse victims in Massachusetts seek
approximately 42,000 civil restraining orders each year in an effort to stop the
violence perpetrated against them and their children.3 Recently, the legislature
and the judiciary have created and implemented three important tools in an
attempt to deal with this increasing problem. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts abolished the marital rape exemption which provided a defense
to marital rape based on the status of the parties.4 Additionally, the
Massachusetts legislature passed both the Abuse Prevention Act (Act) and the
stalking statute in response to the growing awareness of, and concern for,
victims of domestic abuse. 5
1 SANDRA ADAMS & ANNE POWELL, The Tragedies of Domestic Violence, A
Qualitative Analysis of Civil Restraining Orders in Massachusetts, OFFICE OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF PROBATION, October 12, 1995.
2 See ADAMS &POWELL, supra note 1, at 1(finding 48.6% of domestic abuse victims

report being physically abused).
3 MASSACHUSETrS PROBATION SERVICE, Registry of Civil Restraining Orders
Summary, OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PROBATION, July 1, 1995 - June 30, 1996

(detailing 42,323 civil restraining orders filed throughout Massachusetts).
4 See Commonwealth v. Chretien, 383 Mass. 123, 124, 417 N.E.2d 1203, 1205
(1981) (abolishing the marital rape exemption).
5 LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 206-10 (1979). The seminal work
in the domestic violence field is The Battered Woman where Lenore E. Walker discusses
legislative action necessary to protect battered women from abuse. Id. The legislature
anticipated these suggestions when, on July 17, 1978, it adopted the Abuse Prevention Act,
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This article concludes that the Act, the stalking statute, and the abolishment
of the marital rape exemption are necessary measures to help stem the tide of
domestic violence. Section A discusses the marital rape exemption. Section B
analyzes specific sections of the Act and the judicial interpretation of those
sections. Section C analyzes the progressive aspects of the Act and how it
effects protection for domestic violence victims. Section D compares the
advantages and disadvantages of three types of statutory enforcement schemes
and discusses the ways in which Massachusetts has effectively addressed

enforcement. Section E discusses the stalking statute as additional legislative
protection for domestic violence victims. Section F proposes that the legislature

mandate that every defendant served with a protective order receive an
information sheet detailing the Act's provisions and how those provisions
restrict their conduct.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The MaritalRape Exemption
In 1857, Massachusetts became the first state to recognize the common law
"marital rape exemption" which created a defense to rape occurring between
married individuals.6 The Supreme Judicial Court began to erode this archaic

MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, §§ 1-10 (1996). The Act originally addressed all of the legal
concerns Walker wrote about. Id. For example, Walker discusses the need for legislation
protecting both married and unmarried individuals. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED
WOMAN 206-10 (1979). The Act addressed this concern by defining the persons protected
by the Act to include substantive dating relationships. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 1 (1996).
Additionally, the Act's language is gender neutral and therefore protects heterosexual as
well as homosexual couples. Id.
The stalking statute, MASS. GEN. L. cl. 265, § 43 (West 1996), was adopted on May
18, 1992. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (SJC) subsequently clarified the
stalking statute's language in Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski, 418 Mass. 543, 546, 637
N.E.2d 854, 857 (1994). The SJC in Kwiatkowski found the statute's language
unconstitutionally vague as applied to the defendant but clarified the language so that it
would be constitutional as applied to future violations. Kwiatkowski, 418 Mass. at 546, 637
N.E.2d at 857; see also Commonwealth v. Matsos, 421 Mass. 391, 399, 657 N.E.2d 467,
472 (1995) (affirming stalking conviction based on Kwiatkowski decision).
' See Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. 489, 491 (1857) (holding marital rape
exemption valid defense to rape charge). The Fogertycourt reasoned that "it would always
be competent for a party indicted to show, in defense of a charge of rape alleged to be
actually committed by himself, that the woman on whom it was charged to have been
committed was his wife." Id.
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law in Commonwealth v. Chretien.7 In Chretien, the defendant claimed the

marital rape exemption for a rape that occurred before the end of a court ordered
divorce nisi period." A divorce nisi judgment provides that within a statutorily
prescribed period of time following the judgment either party may show cause
why the decree ought to be set aside, or may successfully appeal the decree.9 The
divorce decree is not fimal until the completion of the statutory period.' The
Chretien court held that when a rape occurs after a court grants a divorce nisi,
the marital rape exemption no longer provides a valid defense to the rape charge
because during the statutory nisi period the individuals are not legally married."
The Chretien court stated that the defendant had "fair warning of the
criminality of his conduct" because forced intercourse is unlawful when it occurs
prior to the expiration of the six month nisi period. 2 The court concluded that
"under the statutes in effect at the time of the alleged offenses, the fact that the
victim was the spouse of the defendant was no bar to a conviction of rape."' 3
This decision led to the eventual abolishment of the marital rape exemption in
Massachusetts allowing the Commonwealth to successfully prosecute
individuals charged with raping their spouse.
B. Abuse Prevention under Massachusetts GeneralLaws Chapter209A

The Massachusetts legislature responded to the growing intolerance of
domestic violence when it passed the Abuse Prevention Act in July 1978. " The

' See Commonwealth v. Chretien, 383 Mass. 123, 125, 417 N.E.2d 1203, 1205
(1981) (holding decree of divorce nisi precludes defendant's utilization of marital rape
exemption); Rene Augustine, Marriage: The Safe Haven for Rapists, 29 J. FAM. L. 559,

562 (1991) (recognizing Massachusetts as the first state to adopt the marital rape

exemption).
8 Chretien, 383 Mass. at 125, 417 N.E.2d at 1205.
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 208, § 21 (1995). The statute reads in part as follows:
"Judgments of divorce shall in the first instance be judgments nisi, and shall become

absolute after the expiration of ninety days from the entry thereof ....Id.
"0Id.
When the Supreme Judicial Court decided the Chretien case the statutory period

was six months, however, the legislature has since amended the statute to a three month
period. Id
, Chretien, 383 Mass. at 125, 417 N.E.2d at 1205.
Commonwealthv. Chretien, 383 Mass. 123, 124, 417 N.E.2d 1203, 1205 (1981).
" Id. at 124, 417 N.E.2d at 1205.
14 MAss. GEN. L. ch. 209A, §§ 1-10 (1996); see also Miriam Goldstein Altman,
32

Litigating DomesticAbuse Cases Under ch. 209A, 24 MASS. LAW. WKLY. No. 7,October

23, 1995, at B6 (stating MAss. GEN. L. ch. 209A enacted during "social crisis" when
domestic abuse victims ignored by law enforcement officials).
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Act currently consists of ten sections detailing statutory protection, remedies,
enforcement, and sentencing guidelines. 5 The legislature designed the statute
to give domestic violence victims an effective legal remedy and protect victims
from future incidents of abuse. " This remedy takes the form of a court imposed
protective order, generally referred to as a "209A" order. 7 Although a 209A
order is a civil remedy, if an individual violates the order it is a criminal
offense.' A 209A order allows a judge to impose specific restrictions on an
individual's behavior. 9 The order becomes effective after the court notifies the

"MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, §§ 1-10 (1996). The statute includes the following
sections:
§ 1 Definitions
§ 2 Venue
§ 3 Remedies; period of relief
§ 4 Temporary orders; notice; hearing
§ 5 Granting of relief when court closed; certification
§ 6 Powers of police
§ 7 Abuse prevention orders; domestic violence record search; service of
order; enforcement; violations
§ 8 Address of plaintiff, exclusion from court documents; confidentiality of
records
§ 9 Form of complaints; promulgation
§ 10 Assessments against persons referred to certified batterer's treatment
program as condition of probation.
Id.
16 See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 407 Mass. 340, 347, 553 N.E.2d 915, 919 (1990)
(stating intent of statute is to prevent further abuse between parties). Additionally, the
legislature attempted to prevent the abusive individual from initiating retaliatory legal action
against the victim when it included a provision in the Act requiring the court to provide
written judicial findings when granting protective orders to both parties. MASS. GEN. L. ch.
209A, § 3 (1996). The statute reads in part as follows, "A court may issue a mutual
restraining order or mutual no-contact order pursuant to any abuse prevention action only
if the court has made specific written findings of fact." Id.
"7 See John P. Zanini, Overview ofMass. Gen. L. ch. 209A, The Abuse Prevention
Statute,and the ProsecutorialRole of the DistrictAttorney's Office, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV.
261,261 (1993) (stating protective orders generally provide for the safety of abuse victims
and children).
's MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 7 (1996). The statute reads in part as follows: "Each
abuse prevention order issued shall contain the following statement: VIOLATION OF THIS
ORDER IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE.... Id.
9 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 3 (1996). Section three of the Act sets forth remedies
available when a judge issues a 209A order. Id. The statute reads in part as follows:
A person suffering from abuse from an adult or minor family or household
member may file a complaint in the court requesting protection from such
abuse, including, but not limited to, the following orders:
(a) ordering the defendant to refrain from abusing the plaintiff, whether the
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defendant of the order's existence.2" If the defendant violates the order's
provisions, the Commonwealth may prosecute the defendant. 2
When the Commonwealth convicts a defendant for violating a protective

order, the Act provides a flexible sentencing scheme that allows the sentencing
judge to determine whether the defendant is amenable to rehabilitation through
completion of a batterer's treatment program.22 A judge may sentence a
defendant convicted for violating a protective order to a maximum of two and
one half years in the house of correction and/or a maximum fine of five thousand
dollars.23 If, however, the defendant has no prior record of violent crime and a
judge determines that the defendant is amenable to treatment, a judge may
recommend that the defendant attend a recognized batterer's treatment
program. 4 Failure to complete the court ordered batterer's program may result

defendant is an adult or minor;
(b) ordering the defendant to refrain from contacting the plaintiff, unless
authorized by the court, whether the defendant is an adult or minor;
(c) ordering the defendant to vacate forthwith and remain away from the
household, multiple family dwelling, and work place;
(d) awarding the plaintiff temporary custody of a minor child;
(e) ordering the defendant to pay temporary support for the plaintiff or any
child in the plaintiffs custody or both, when the defendant has a legal
obligation to support such a person;
(f) ordering the defendant to pay the person abused monetary compensation
for the losses suffered as a direct result of such abuse;
(g) ordering the plaintiffs address to be impounded as provided in section
nine;
(h) ordering the defendant to refrain from abusing or contacting the
plaintiffs child, or child in plaintiffs care or custody, unless authorized by
the court;
(i) the judge may recommend to the defendant that the defendant attend a
recognized batterer's treatment program.
Id.
20 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 7 (1996).
21 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 3 (1996).
22 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 3(i) (1996).

MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 7 (1996). The statute reads in part as follows:
Any violation of such [209A] order, or a protection order issued by another
jurisdiction, shall be punishable by a fine of not more than five thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than two and one-half years in a
house of correction, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Id.
24 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 3(i) (1996). In 1977, a group of men in Cambridge,
Massachusetts developed the first batterer's treatment program in the country. Emerge:
Counseling and Education to Stop Male Violence, Because Wanting To Stop Is Not Enough
(pamphlet issued by Emerge's main office at 18 Hurley Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts
2
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in the court imposing any previously suspended sentence.'

This flexible

sentencing scheme allows a judge to assess whether first time violent offenders
will benefit more from batterer's treatment than from a prison term.'
The Act provides abuse victims who are unrepresented by counsel ready
access to the courts because the procedure for seeking a protective order is
simple. For example, a person seeking protection from abuse under chapter
209A may obtain an ex-parte protective or temporary order by filing a complaint
in superior, district, or probate and family court.27 Any individual, including

02141). In 1992, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health hired Emerge to train
groups interested in qualifying as certified batterer's treatment programs under the Abuse
Prevention Act Elena Salzman, The Quincy DistrictCourtDomestic Violence Prevention
Program: A Model Legal Frameworkfor Domestic Violence Intervention, 74 B.U. L. REV.
329, 353 (1994). There are now approximately sixteen certified batterer's treatment
programs throughout Massachusetts. Patricia Nealon, Batterers: Common Characteristics,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 1, 1992, at 14.
" MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 7 (1996). The statute reads in part as follows: "If the
defendant ordered to undergo treatment has received a suspended sentence, the original
sentence shall be reimposed if the defendant fails to participate in said program as required
by the terms of his probation." Id.
' Id. The statute further prescribes a standard certification requirement for all
batteres treatment programs throughout the state ensuring consistency between treatment
techniques and programs. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 209A, § 3 note (St. 1990, ch. 403, § 16). The
historical notes read in part as follows:
Within six months of the effective date of this act, guidelines and standards
for the certification of batterer's treatment programs by the department of
public health shall be set up by a commission to be established by the chief
justice of the trial court department, one member of which shall be a district
attorney or his designee, two of which shall be members of a recognized
batterers treatment program with training experience, two of which shall be
members of a domestic violence program or the statewide coalition of
programs which provide services to victims of domestic violence and one of
whom shall be a member from a probation department.... The department
of public health shall thereafter certify and monitor batterer's treatment
programs according to the standards established and promulgated by the
commission. Programs so certified shall be the only batterer's treatment
programs appropriate for court referrals.
Id.
2' 7MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 2 (1996). The statute
reads in part as follows:
"Proceedings under this chapter shall be filed, heard and determined in the superior court
department or the Boston municipal court department or respective divisions of the probate
and family or district court departments having venue over the plaintiffs residence." Id.
Additionally, a domestic abuse victim may obtain an emergency protective order at any time,
including when courts are not in session. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 5 (1996). The statute
reads in part, as follows:
When the court is closed for business.., any justice of the superior,
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indigent victims, may file for a protective order because the Act does not require
a filing fee. 2' Additionally, victim witness advocates are available in most courts
to assist plaintiffs with the 209A application procedure, obviating the need for
an attorney. 29
The Act also provides that the court may not consider the length of the time
since the last incident of abuse when deciding whether to grant an order." As
a result, individuals are not prevented or discouraged from obtaining or
extending an order if the last incident of abuse occurred some time ago.Additionally, new legislation allows a third party to apply for a restraining order

probate and family, district or Boston municipal court departments may
grant relief to the plaintiff as provided under section four [by granting a
temporary protective order if the plaintiff demonstrates a substantial
likelihood of immediate danger of abuse. In the discretion of the justice,
such reliefmay be granted and communicated by telephone to an officer or
employee of an appropriate law enforcement agency, who shall record such
order on a form... and shall deliver a copy of this order on the next court
day to the clerk-magistrate of the court having venue and jurisdiction over
the matter. If relief has been granted without the filing of a complaint...
then the plaintiff shall appear in court on the next available business day to
file said complaint.
Id.
21 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 3 (1996). The statute reads in part as follows: "No
filing fee shall be charged for the filing of the complaint." Id.; MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, §
9 (1996). The statute reads in part as follows:
The administrative justices of the superior court, probate and family court,
district court, and the Boston municipal court departments shall jointly
promulgate a form of complaint for use under this chapter which shall be in
such form and language to permit a plaintiff to prepare and file such
complaint pro se.
Id.
" See MASSACHUSETTS OFFICE FOR VICTIM ASSISTANCE, COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS, A GUIDE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT ADVOCACY IN MASSACHUSETTS
10, 17-19 (1993) (stating necessity of specialized domestic violence advocate in court
sessions wherein civil protective orders granted); Salzman, supra note 20, at 341
(describing Quincy District Court's specialized-domestic violence clerks' role of assisting
victims seeking protective orders).
30 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 3 (1996). The statute reads in part as follows:
The fact that abuse has not occurred during the pendency of an order shall
not, in itself, constitute sufficient ground for denying or failing to extend
the order, of allowing an order to expire or be vacated, or for refusing to
issue a new order.... A court shall not deny any complaint filed under this
chapter solely because it was not filed within a particular time period after
the last alleged incident of abuse.
Id.
31 Id.
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on behalf of a plaintiff who is physically unable to do so. 2 All of these
provisions simplify the procedure for obtaining a protective order for pro se
plaintiffs.
After the plaintiff files the complaint, a judge reviews the complaint and the
victim's supporting affidavit during an ex parte hearing. The judge grants a
temporary order provided that the plaintiff demonstrates a "substantial
likelihood of immediate danger of abuse." 33 The plaintiff may file and receive
a temporary order at any time because the statute does not require both parties
to be present at the hearing.' The court issues a temporary order at the ex parte
hearing for an initial ten day period.35 Following the ex parte hearing, the
defendant is served with the order and notified when the court will hold a full
hearing on the order.36 At this hearing, often called a "ten day hearing," the

12MAss. GEN. L. ch.209A, § 5 (1996). The 1996 addition to this statutory provision
reads as follows:
If the plaintiff in such a case [demonstrates a substantial likelihood of
immediate danger of abuse, and] is unable to appear in court without severe
hardship due to the plaintiff's physical condition, then a representative may
appear in court on the plaintiff's behalf and file the requisite complaint with
an affidavit setting forth the circumstances preventing the plaintiff from
appearing personally.
Id.
3 MASS.GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 4 (1996). The statute reads in part as follows: "If the
plaintiff demonstrates a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of abuse, the court may
enter such temporary relief orders without notice as it deems necessary to protect the
plaintiff from abuse...." Id.
34

Id.

31 Id.;

Altman, supra note 14, at B6. In 1992, the Massachusetts Commissioner of
Probation implemented "the nations first statewide, centrally computerized, domestic
violence record keeping system" called the Registry of Civil Restraining Orders. ADAMS &
POWELL, supra note 1, at 3. This system makes available to court and police personnel
information regarding the issuance of restraining orders inMassachusetts on the day the
order is issued. ADAMS & POWELL, supra note 1, at 3.
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 4 (1996). The statute reads in part as follows:
[T]he court may enter such temporary relief orders without notice as it
deems necessary to protect the plaintiff from abuse and shall immediately
thereafter notify the defendant that the temporary orders have been issued.
The court shall give the defendant an opportunity to be heard on the

question of continuing the temporary order and of granting other relief as
requested by the plaintiff no later than ten court business days after such
orders are entered.
Id.
In Commonwealth v. McCarthy, LAW. WKLY. No. 16-033-96 (Docket #
9651CR2591), Judge Sanders of the Waltham District Court held that when no evidence
exists that a defendant was served with a 209A order and the defendant was not otherwise

VICTIMS OFDOMESTICABUSE

1997]

court gives the defendant an opportunity to be heard.3 7 If the defendant fails to
attend the ten day hearing, the court will automatically extend the temporary
order for one year.3 If the plaintiff fails to attend the hearing, however, the court

the
will vacate the order. After the initial one year period the plaintiff may renew 39
imposed.
permanently
order
the
have
to
seek
or
year
additional
an
for
order
Recent case law illustrates the limiting effects of 209A restrictions and the
need for the legislature to include a provision within the Act that informs
defendants served with protective orders what conduct a court will find to violate
the order. For example, once a judge has granted a no contact order, if the
defendant subsequently contacts the plaintiff in any way, the defendant has
violated the order and the Commonwealth may prosecute the defendant for the
violation.' In Commonwealth v. Butler,4 the Massachusetts Court of Appeals
held that a defendant, who anonymously sent a flower arrangement to his
girlfriend while on notice that a 209A order was in effect, violated the "no
contact" provision of the order because he acted indirectly, through someone
else, to contact the plaintiff.42 The defendant argued that the "no contact"
provision was unconstitutionally vague.43 The court disagreed, finding the

notified of the order's existence, the defendant can not be held to have violated the order.
Judge Sanders stated in part:
I do not view this requirement of service [of a 209A order] as a technical
one. If a 209A order is to afford any real protection to victims of domestic
abuse, then the target of the order must be on clear notice as to what he
must refrain from doing and that he is subject to criminal penalties if he
does not obey the specific terms that the order sets forth.
McCarthy, LAW. WKLY. No. 16-033-96 (Docket # 9651CR2591).
37 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 4 (1996).
m MAss. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 4 (1996). The statute reads in part as follows: "If the
defendant does not appear at such subsequent [ten day] hearing, the temporary orders shall
continue in effect without further order of the court." Id.; MASs. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 3
(1996). The statute reads in part as follows: "Any relief granted by the court shall be for a
fixed period of time not to exceed one year." MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 3 (1996).
3 MAss. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 3 (1996). The statute reads in part as follows: "If the
plaintiff appears at the court at the date and time the order is to expire, the court shall
determine whether or not to extend the order for any additional time reasonably necessary
to protect the plaintiff or to enter a permanent order." Id.
40 See DIANE JULIAR & CAROLYN KESHIAN, The Abuse PreventionAct: Chapter 209A
- Summary, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, at 11, October 1995 (listing 209A

violations resulting in criminal sanctions).
4' 40 Mass. App. Ct. 906,661 N.E.2d 666 (1996).
42

Butler, 40 Mass. App. Ct. at 907, 661 N.E.2d at 667.

43 Id.
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statutory language needed no further explanation. 44 This case illustrates that
although the statutoiy language does not explicitly state every situation that may
result in a no-contact violation, the court presumes that defendants understand
that any contact that they cause, no matter how far removed, will violate the
court's order.
Additionally, 209A orders restrict conduct because they limit where the
defendant may and may not go depending on the defendant's physical proximity
to the plaintiff. For example, where the police found a defendant across the
street from a plaintiff's workplace, they arrested the defendant for violating a
protective order.45 The order mandated that the defendant stay at least one
hundred yards away from the plaintiff and stay away from her workplace.' The
plainti however, was not at work during the time period in which the defendant
was near her workplace. 47 The Massachusetts Court of Appeals reversed the
defendant's conviction because, regardless of his intent, the defendant was never
within one hundred yards of the plaintiff, and never entered the plaintiff's
workplace.' The court determined that, under the circumstances, the defendant
did not violate the order. 49 The previous two scenarios emphasize the need to
inform defendants specifically what behavior the court will consider to violate
a protective order because the statute is not specific enough to accomplish this
goal.
C. The ProgressiveAspects ofMassachusetts GeneralLaws Chapter209A.
1. Victim Protection
The Abuse Prevention Act, in addition to protecting married persons,
provides protection for individuals who are involved in substantive dating
relationships with individuals of the same or different genders, or members of
the same household.' These latter two classes of individuals are not always
protected by the statutes of other states."' The Act definesfamily or household

4

Id.

"- Commonwealth v. O'Shea, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 115, 115, 668 N.E.2d 861, 861
(1996).
46

Id.

47 Id.
48 Id.

Id.
o MAsS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 1 (1996).

49

'1 See ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (1989) (excluding individuals in substantive dating
relationships from class of individuals protected under abuse prevention statute); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 901(9) (1994) (specifying gender of individuals protected under abuse
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members to include the following relationships:
[P]ersons who:
(a) are or were married to one another;
(b) are or were residing together in the same household;
(c) are or were related by blood or marriage;
(d) having a child in common regardless of whether they have ever
married or lived together; or
(e) are or have been in a substantive dating or engagement
relationship .... 52
The legislature's inclusion of an abuse victim involved in a substantive
dating relationship is a progressive approach to protecting individuals who are
53
not similarly protected under the statutes of other states.
Almost fifty percent of the 209A orders issued in Massachusetts involve
individuals who are or have been in a dating relationship.' Couples involved in
substantive dating relationships include individuals who are neither married, nor
living together, regardless of gender."5 The Act protects those individuals
involved in a relationship who once lived together and those individuals who
were previously involved, but never lived together.' A court considers the
following factors to determine whether a couple is involved in a substantive
dating relationship: (1) the length of time of the relationship; (2) the type of
relationship; (3) the frequency of interaction between the parties; and (4) the
length of time elapsed since the termination of the relationship."
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts partially defined the
parameters of a substantive dating relationship in Brossardv. West Roxbury
Division ofDistrict Court."' The Brossardcourt held that a fourteen month
sexual relationship, where the couple saw each other two to three times a week,

prevention statute).
52 MAss. GEN. L.

ch. 209A, § 1 (1996).

See ALA. CODE § 30-5-2 (1989) (omitting substantive dating relationship from
Familyor Household Member statutory definition); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 (Michie
53

1993) (omitting substantive dating relationship from Family or Household Members
definition).
' See ADAMS & POWELL, supra note 1, at 1 (finding 48.9% of protective orders
issued to persons previously or currently involved in dating relationships).
" MASs. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 1 (1996). The use of gender specific language is

notably absent from the Act. Id.
5 Id.
7 Id.
" 417 Mass. 183, 629 N.E.2d 295 (1994).
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qualified as a substantive dating relationship.59 Although the complainant lived
with another man during the same time period, the Brossard court recognized
that the statute does not preclude the victim from involvement in more than one

substantive relationship at a time.'
In contrast to the breadth of the Massachusetts Act, the Arkansas abuse
prevention statute does not provide protection for individuals involved in
substantive dating relationships.6' The Arkansas statute specifically protects
those family or household members who are or have been married, live or have
lived together, are children or parents, and are related to the fourth degree of
consanguinity.62 This definition precludes statutory protection for persons who
are or have been involved in a substantive dating relationship, but have never
lived together, and protects individuals who are or have been involved in a
substantive dating relationship who have lived together.6 3 Compared to the
Arkansas statute, the Massachusetts Act offers protection to a wider class of

individuals.
In addition to protecting individuals in substantive dating relationships, the
Massachusetts Act is gender neutral because it applies to both female and male

victims as well as heterosexual and homosexual domestic disputes.6 In contrast,

"' Id. at 185, 629 N.E.2d at 296.
"Id.
" ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-103 (Michie 1993).
62 ARK. CODEANN. § 9-15-103 (Michie 1993). The statute reads in part as follows:
"'Family or household members' means spouses, former spouses, parents and children,
persons related by blood within the fourth degree of consanguinity, and persons who are
presently or in the past have resided or co-habitated together." Id.
63

Id.

"See MAss. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 1 (1995) (definingfamily or household members
as persons,absent gender descriptions); JULIAR & KESHIAN, supra note 39, at 2 (describing
individuals protected by the Abuse Prevention Act). Juliar and Keshian describe the
individuals protected by the Massachusetts Abuse Prevention Act, as follows:
Chapter 209A can be used by both men and women, adults and minors, and
in heterosexual or same-sex relationships. For example, under the
definition of "family or household member," any person, regardless of sex
or age, who has been abused by a spouse, former spouse, household member
or former household member (who need not be of the opposite sex), past or
present in-laws, step-children, or a blood relative, including a minor child,
may file a c. 209A abuse petition. Blood relatives, in-laws, step-children,
someone who has a child in common, and someone who is or was involved
in a "substantive dating or engagement relationship" need not ever have
resided with the plaintiff.
JULIAR & KESHIAN, supra note 40, at 2. Additionally, the Massachusetts sexual
assault statutes are gender neutral. MAss. GEN. L. ch. 265, §§ 22-24 (1980).
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the Arizona Abuse Prevention statute explicitly defines individuals eligible for
protection as "persons of the opposite sex residing or having resided in the same
'
household."65
This definition precludes protection for individuals involved in
same sex relationships.' Similarly, the Delaware abuse prevention statute
defines protected classes as "family members and former spouses, a man and a
woman co-habitating together with or without a child of either or both, or a man
and a woman living separate and apart with a child in common." ' 7 Unlike the
Massachusetts Act, both Arizona and Delaware preclude individuals who are
living with and abused by a same sex partner from statutory protection.
2. Protective Order Violation
Evincing the legislature's serious regard for domestic violence, the
Massachusetts Act imposes a harsh penalty on a defendant who is convicted of

violating a protective order.' The penalty provided in the statute mandates that
every restraining order served on a defendant contain the following language:
Violation of this order is a criminal offense. Any violation of such order

6 ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (1994) (emphasis added). The statute reads in
part as follows:
"Domestic violence" means any act which is a dangerous crime... if the
relationship between the victim and the defendant is one of marriage or
former marriage or of persons of the opposite sex residing or having resided
in the same household or if the victim and defendant or the defendant's
spouse are related to each other by consanguinity or affinity to the second
degree.
Id.

" Id.
67 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 901(9) (1994). The statute reads in part as follows:
"Family' means husband and wife; a man and woman co-habitating in a home in which
there are children of either or both; custodian and child; or any group of persons related by
blood or marriage who are residing in one home under one head." Id.; DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
10, § 1041 (1994). The statute reads in part as follows:
(2) "Domestic violence" means abuse perpetrated by one member against
another member of the following protected classes:
(i) Family, as that term is defined in § 901(9) of this title, regardless,
however, of state of residence of the parties; or
(ii) Former spouses, a man and a woman co-habitating together with or
without a child of either or both, or a man and a woman living separate and
apart with a child in common.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041 (1994).
u See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 7 (1996)(defining the penalty for a protective order
violation). But see MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 3 (i) (1996) (allowing sentence suspension
for protective order violation if judge orders defendant to complete batterer's treatment
program and defendant completes program).
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or a protection order issued by another jurisdiction, shall be punishable by
a fine of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment for not more than two
and one half years in a house of correction, or by both such fine and
imprisonment. 9
Notifying defendants of the consequences of a restraining order violation
may deter them from committing subsequent violations. Not every state statute,
however, has such high penalties associated with protective order violations. For
example, violation of the Arkansas protective order statute may result in a
maximum sentence of one year in prison, or a maximum fine of one thousand
dollars, or both.7"
In contrast, Alabama's abuse prevention statute's maximum penalty
scheme takes an entirely different approach by delineating higher penalties for
each subsequent conviction.7 A first offense is punishable as a Class A
misdemeanor which requires no minimum sentence or fine.72 A second
conviction is "punishable by a minimum of 48 hours of continuous
imprisonment in addition to any permissible fine," and the third conviction is
punishable by a minimum sentence of thirty days imprisonment
plus any
4
permissible fine.' 3 These sentences cannot be suspended.'

69

MASS. GEN. L. cl. 209A, § 7 (1996).

ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-207 (Michie 1993). The statute reads in part as follows:
"Any order of protection shall include a notice to the respondent or party restrained that a
violation of the order is a Class A misdemeanor carrying a maximum penalty of one (1) year
imprisonment in the county jail or a fine of up to one thousand dollars ($1,000), or both."
Id.
7, See ALA. CODE § 30-5A-3 (1989) (detailing the penalty scheme for protective order
violations).
72 Id. The ALA. CODE § 30-5A-3 (1989), reads as follows:
Any violation of this chapter is a Class A misdemeanor. A second
conviction for violation of this chapter shall, in addition to any permissible
fine, be punishable by a minimum of 48 hours continuous imprisonment
which may not be suspended. A third, or subsequent conviction shall, in
addition to any permissible fine, be punishable by a minimum sentence of
30 days imprisonment which may not be suspended.
Id. A Class A misdemeanor prison term is defined as follows: "Sentences for
misdemeanors shall be a definite term of imprisonment in the county jail or to hard labor
for the county, within the following limitations: (1) For a Class A misdemeanor, not more
than one year." ALA. CODE § 13A-5-7 (1978). A Class A misdemeanor fine is defined as
follows: "(a) A sentence to pay a fine for a misdemeanor shall be for a definite amount,
fixed by the court, within the following limitations: (1) For a Class A misdemeanor, not
more than $2,000..." ALA. CODE § 13A-5-12 (1980).
7 ALA. CODE § 30-5A-3 (1989).
74Id.
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The Alabama scheme increases the penalty for each successive conviction
and also sets out continuous, mandatory, non-suspendable sentences for
offenders." The penalties, however, remain too low to convince defendants that
violation of a protective order is a serious offense. This scheme would deter
abuse prevention order violations more effectively if the Alabama legislature

increased the initial statutory penalty. For example, if the first offense was
punishable by a minimum of forty eight hours in the county jail and the second
offense punishable by a minimum of fifteen days in the county jail, then the
deterrent effect would be greater.
3. Full Faith and Credit Consideration For Out of State Protective
Orders
The Massachusetts legislature amended the Abuse Prevention Act in 1996
to define a protection order issued by another jurisdiction as an order issued by
another state or United States Territory that prevents contact with or abuse from
the person served with the order.7 6 The amendment provides that Massachusetts
must give full faith and credit to all restraining orders granted in other
jurisdictions." This amendment protects individuals who possess out of state
orders while they are in Massachusetts."8
Law enforcement officials are able to enforce orders from other
jurisdictions because the Massachusetts statewide Registry of Civil Restraining

Orders (Registry) contains information on valid protective orders filed with
Massachusetts courts. 9 The statewide Registry contains information regarding

7S
7'

Id.
MAss. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 1 (1996). The statute reads in part as follows:
Protection order issued by another jurisdiction, any injunction or other

order issued by a court of another state, teritory or possession of the United
States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia, or
tribal court that is issued for the purpose of preventing violent or threatening
acts or harassment against, or contact or communication with or physical
proximity to another person, including temporary and final orders issued by
civil and criminal courts filed by or on behalf of a person seeking protection.
Id.
7 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 5A (1996). The statute reads in part as follows: "Any
protection order issued by another jurisdiction, as defined in section one, shall be given full
faith and credit throughout the commonwealth and enforced as if it were issued in the
commonwealth for as long as the order is in effect in the issuing jurisdiction." Id.
73 Id.
7' MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 5A (1996). The statute reads in part as follows:
A person entitled to protection under a protection order issued by another
jurisdiction may file such order in the superior court department or the
Boston municipal court department or any division of the probate and family
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defendants who are on probation, parole, the subject of a valid 209A order, or
wanted for default warrants.8 ° Following the passage of the amendment to the
Abuse Prevention Act in 1996, the Registry now contains information regarding
persons in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts who are the subject of valid,
extraterritorial protective orders."'
When a person protected by an
extraterritorial order files it in the appropriate Massachusetts court, the
information is added to the Registry. 2 The amendment also notes that a court
will presume an order's validity if any individual gives an out of state protective
order to a law enforcement officer accompanied by a statement from the
protected individual corroborating the order's validity."3 The addition of
extraterritorial protective orders to the Registry ensures that when law
enforcement officers consult the Registry they will know whether an individual
is the subject of a protective order, extraterritorial or otherwise.
Massachusetts protective orders are also enforceable on United States
military property. In Cobb v. Cobb, 4 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts addressed two questions of law, namely, whether Massachusetts
judges have the authority to issue protective orders that take effect on land ceded
to the federal government, and whether those orders are thereafter valid and
enforceable.85 The court reasoned that past case law "does not bar extension of
the benefits and burdens of all State laws to inhabitants of land ceded to the

or district court departments by filing with the court a certified copy of such
order which shall be entered into the statewide domestic violence record
keeping system established pursuant to the provisions of section seven of
chapter one hundred and eighty-eight of the acts of nineteen hundred and

ninety-two and maintained by the office of the commissioner of probation.
Id.
SId.
2

Id.
Id.

MAss. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 5A (1996). The statute reads in part as follows:
A law enforcement officer may presume the validity of, and enforce in
accordance with section six, a copy of a protection order issued by another
jurisdiction winch has been provided to the law enforcement officer by any
source: provided, however, that the officer is also provided with a statement
by the person protected by the order that such order remains in effect. Law
enforcement officers may rely on such statement by the person protected by
such order.
Id.
84 406 Mass. 21, 545 N.E.2d 1161 (1989).
8s Cobb, 406 Mass. at 21, 545 N.E.2d at 1161. Although the case was moot at the

time of decision because the order expired without the defendant violating it, the court
addressed both questions. Id.
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federal governmenL" The court concluded that Massachusetts judges do have
the authority to issue protective orders that take effect on land ceded to the
Federal government and that those orders are both valid and enforceable."7 This
decision clarifies the ambiguity surrounding a Massachusetts judge's authority
with respect to issuing protective orders that take effect on property within
Massachusetts, but under federal government control.
D. Enforcement OfMassachusetts GeneralLaws Chapter209A Through
PoliceAction And Variations On The Authority To Arrest
After an abuse victim obtains a protective order, police enforcement of the
order can help to ensure his/her safety. A person who violates the vacate, no
contact, and/or refrain from abuse provisions of a 209A order is subject to
criminal sanctions and arrest."' Most state domestic violence arrest policies
allow police to make warrantless misdemeanor arrests when the officer believes
an individual committed a crime."9 Warrantless misdemeanor arrest allows
police officers to detain the violator of a protective order upon reasonable belief
that a violation occurred without actually seeing the violation first hand.' An
officer may make a warrantless arrest if the officer believes that the defendant
placed an individual protected under a 209A order in fear of imminent serious
physical harm.9" As a result, police may arrest individuals in domestic violence
situations even where the police do not witness the abuse.
The amount of discretion an arrest policy gives police officers in making
domestic arrests may effect the victim's safety. The three statutory warrantless
arrest schemes are characterized as permissive, pro-arrest, and mandatory

Id. at 24, 545 N.E.2d at 1163.
'

Id. at 26, 545 N.E.2d at 1164.
JULIAR & KESHIAN, supra note 40.

s' See Donna M. Welch, Mandatory Arrest of Domestic Abusers: Panaceaor
Perpetuation of the Problem of Abuse?, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 1133, 1148-49 (1994)

(describing wammless arrest policies). At common law, an officer may make a warrantless
misdemeanor arrest in the following circumstances: (1) the defendant's actions involve a
breach of the peace; (2) the arresting officer views the act or the act occurs in the officer's
presece; and (3) the act is "continuing at the time of the arrest or only interrupted, so that
the offense and the arrest form parts of one transaction." Commonwealth v. Gorman, 288
Mass. 294, 297, 192 N.E.2d 618, 619 (1934).
0 Welch, supra note 89, at 1149. A protective order violation need not be the result
of abuse. An individual may also violate the no contact or vacate provisions of a protective
order.
91 Commonwealth v. Jacobsen, 419 Mass. 269, 273, 644 N.E.2d 213, 216 (1995).
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arrest.9 2 Each scheme varies with regard to the amount of discretion police
officers may use when making domestic arrests. For example, a permissive
arrest policy leaves the choice of whether to arrest either party involved in a
domestic dispute entirely to the responding officer's discretion if the officer finds
probable cause to arrest.93 When the choice to arrest is left to the officer's
discretion, however, many officers choose not to arrest.94 The police officer's
decision is based on many factors including the seriousness of the victim's
injuries and the reasons the perpetrator gives for the abuse.9' Therefore, the
victim's immediate safety becomes dependent upon the individual officer's
perception of the situation which may lead to inconsistent application of the
permissive arrest policy.'
Unlike permissive arrest policies, mandatory arrest policies remove police
discretion and may result in the officer arresting both the victim and the abusive
individual.97 Under a mandatory arrest scheme, an officer who fmds probable
cause that one or both parties committed a crime or violated a protective order
must arrest the party or parties. 9' While officers are more likely to follow this
policy consistently, a mandatory arrest scheme may potentially discourage

victims from calling the police if the victim does not want the police to arrest the
abusive individual.9 Additionally, this policy may result in arrest of both the

92

Welch, supra note 89, at 1149.

Welch, supra note 89, at 1149.
Sarah M Buel, MandatoyArrestforDomestic Violence, 11 HARV. WOMEN4S L.J.
213, 217 (1988) (citing statistical studies wherein police officers permitted to use discretion
chose not to arrest). Under a permissive arrest scheme, a Milwaukee study found that while
eighty-two percent of domestic abuse victims requested the police to arrest their batterers',
the police arrested only fourteen percent of those individuals. Bowker, Police Services to
Battered Women: Bad or Not So Bad?, 9 CRIM. JUST. &BEHAV. 476, 485-86 (1982).
" See Buel, supra note 94, at 217 (discussing various considerations police officers
utilize in deciding whether to arrest).
Buel, supra note 94, at 217.
Buel, supra note 94, at 217.
' See The Harv. L. Rev. Assoc., New State and FederalResponses to Domestic
Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1537 (1993) (describing mandatory arrest policies);
Buel, supra note 94, at 225 (discussing circumstances when police make dual arrests in
domestic violence situations).
" See Buel, supra note 94, at 222 (noting reasons why victims may not want the
abuser arrested). A few of these reasons include the following:
(1) fearing that the batterer will become more abusive in retaliation for the
arrest; (2) not wanting the children to witness their father's arrest; (3) not
wanting the batterer to lose his job or stop providing support to the family;
or (4) believing that the violence was her fault and she should have done
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offender and the abuse victim regardless of the police officer's belief that the
victim used justifiable force to protect themselves."°
Massachusetts maintains a pro-arrest policy that effectively combines
aspects of both mandatory and permissive arrest policies.'' The Massachusetts
pro-arrest policy mandates arrest when the officer believes that a person violated

a temporary or permanent protective order."° This policy allows police officers
to use discretion to arrest where the circumstances warrant, while mandating

something to prevent the abuse.
Buel, supra note 94, at 222.
"o See The Harv. L. Rev. Assoc., supra note 98, at 1538-39 (describing
circumstances where mandatory arrest results in arrest of both victim and abuser).
Mandatory arrest requires police officers to arrest any individual who causes bodily harm
upon another. The Harv. L. Rev. Assoc., supra note 98, at 1538-39. Therefore, under a
mandatory arrest scheme, in addition to arresting the abusive partner the police must also
arrest a victim who may have caused harm while attempting to protect her or himself The
Harv. L. Rev. Assoc., supra note 98, at 1538-39. Advantages to a mandatory arrest scheme,
however, do exist. The Harv. L. Rev. Assoc., supra note 98, at 1538-39. For example,
mandatory arrest provisions prevent police officers from making arrests for discriminatory
reasons. The Harv. L. Rev. Assoc., supra note 98, at 1538-39.
'0' MAss. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 6 (1996); see Welch, supra note 94, at 1150
(describing aspects of pro-arrest policies). Section six of chapter 209A of the Massachusetts
General Laws reads in part as follows:
Whenever any law officer has reason to believe that a family or household
member has been abused or is in danger of being abused, such officer shall
take, but not be limited to the following action:

(7) arrest any person a law officer witnesses or has probable cause to believe
has violated a temporary or permanent vacate, restraining, or no-contact
order or judgment issued pursuant to-section eighteen, thirty-four B or
thirty-four C of chapter two hundred and eight, section thirty-two of chapter
two hundred and nine, section three, three B, three C, four or five of this
chapter, or sections fifteen or twenty of chapter two hundred and nine C, or
similar protection order issued by another jurisdiction. When there are no
vacate, restraining or no contact orders or judgments in effect, arrest shall
be the preferred response whenever an officer witnesses or has probable
cause to believe that a person:
(a) has committed a felony;
(b)has committed a misdemeanor involving abuse as defined in section one
of this chapter;
(c) has committed an assault and battery in violation of section thirteen A
of chapter two hundred and sixty-five.
MAss. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 6 (1996).
302 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 6 (1996).
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arrest when an individual violates a protective order. 3 Police officers are more
likely to consistently arrest under this policy because it specifically dictates those
instances when an arrest is discretionary and when it is mandatory."°4
E. An AdditionalMassachusettsStatutory EnactmentAffording Protection
From Abuse: The Stalking Statute.

In 1991, the Massachusetts state legislature further enhanced statutory
protection for domestic abuse victims by criminalizing stalking in violation of
a temporary or permanent vacate, restraining, or no-contact order."05 In enacting
this statute, the legislature recognized that ninety percent of women killed by
their husbands and boyfriends are initially stalked by them."°6 Prior to the
cuiminaliaTniOl of stalking, victims stalked by their abusers, who did not possess

a 209A order, had no remedy until the abuser committed a crime.'0 7
The language of the stalking statute was constitutionally challenged in
Commonwealth v. Kwiatkowski.S The defendant argued that the statutory
language did not clearly state whether a violation required repeated acts of

harassment or a single continuous series of acts. " The Supreme Judicial Court
"03Id. If, however, there is no protective order in place and the officer believes that
a person committed an assault and battery, a felony, or violated a protective order's abuse
provisions, then the Act does not mandate the officer to arrest the offender. Id.; see also
BOSTON POuCE DEPARTMENT RULES AND PROCEDURES, R. 327, § 5 (1992). The Boston

Police Department R. 327 on criminal complaints reads as follows: "Arrests will be made
and criminal complaints will be sought for all violations of c. 209A orders which occur
within the City of Boston, regardless of the city/town or court where the action originated
.
.BOSTONPOLICE DEPARTMENT RULES AND PROCEDURES, R. 327, § 5 (1992).
"oSee Buel, supra note 94, at 217 (describing circumstances when police officers are
likely to arrest).
105 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 43 (West 1996). This statute also protects
individuals who do not have a protective order in place under MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A.
'" See Robert A. Guy Jr., The Nature and Constitutionalityof Stalking Laws, 46
VAND. L. REV. 991,996 (1993) (citing statistics wherein victims are previously stalked by
their abuser).
107Id.
'"

418 Mass. 543, 637 N.E.2d 854 (1994).

'0'
Kwiatkowski, 418 Mass. at 546, 637 N:E.2d at 857. The language of the stalking
statute originally read as follows:
Whoever willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another
person and who makes a threat with the intent to place that person in
imminent fear of death or serious bodily injury shall be guilty of the crime
of stalking and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not
more than five years or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars, or
imprisonment in the house of correction for not more than two and one-half
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of Massachusetts clarified the language by requiring that a "pattern of conduct"
and "series of acts" involve more than two incidents." 0 In response to the
Kwiatkowski opinion, the Massachusetts legislature formally adopted the
Supreme Judicial Court's language in a 1996 amendment making the statutory
language constitutional on its face."' Additionally, the legislature further
amended the stalking statute in 1997 to include threats via mail or electronic
mediums.' 12
The enactment of the stalking legislation was a welcome and necessary
complement to the Abuse Prevention Act because it criminalized harassing
conduct that previously remained unpenalized. Violation of Mass. Gen. L. ch.
265, § 43 carries a penalty with a maximum sentence of five years in the state
prison, or a fine not to exceed one thousand dollars." 3 When the crime of
stalking, however, is in violation of a temporary or permanent restraining order,
the court must impose a mandatory minimum sentence of one year and not more

years or both.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 43 (West 1996).
"0 Kwiatkowski, 418 Mass. at 546, 637 N.E.2d at 857. The Kwiatkowski court
applied the clarification of the statute's language prospectively, resulting in the reversal of
the defendant's conviction. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Matsos, 421 Mass. 391, 399,
657 N.E.2d 467,472 (1995) (affirming stalking conviction based on Kwiatkowski decision).
The revised language of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 43 (West 1994), reads as
follows:
(a) Whoever (1) wilfully and maliciously engages in a knowing pattern of
conduct or series of acts over a period of time directed at a specific person
which seriously alarms or annoys that person and would cause a reasonable
person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and (2) makes a threat with
the intent to place that person in imminent fear of death or bodily injury,
shall be guilty of the crime of stalking.
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 265, § 43 (1996).
.' MASS. GEN. L. ch. 265, § 43(b) (1996); see Kwiatkowski, 418 Mass. at 547, 637

N.E.2d at 849 (clarifying statutory language).
"'

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 43 (West Supp. 1997). The statute reads, in pertinent

part: "Such conduct , acts or threats described in this paragraph shall include, but not be
limited to, electronic mail, internet communicaltions and facsimile communications." Id.
"3 MASs. GEN. L. ch. 265, § 43 (1996). The statute reads in part as follows:
Whoever ... shall be guilty of the crime of stalking and shall be punished
by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years or by a fine
of not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisonment in the house of
correction for not more than two and one-half years or both.
Id.
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than five years of imprisonment in jail or state prison." 4 A subsequent
conviction under the statute carries a mandatory minimum sentence of two years

and not more than ten years in state prison."' By enacting this legislation, the
legislature recognized the importance of protecting victims of domestic violence
from being stalked by their abusive partners.
F ProposedAddition to 209A Law: Dissemination ofHelpful Information
to Defendants.

The current Abuse Prevention Act provides for the dissemination of an
information sheet to victims providing referral numbers for shelters, hot-lines,
legal services, hospitals, and police and details victim rights and responsibilities
under the 209A order." 6 The information sheet is a vital part of the 209A law
because it provides victims with information which may aid them in further
protecting themselves from future abusive incidents. Aside from the order itself,
however, the Act does not provide a defendant subject to protective order

n4 MAsS. GEN. L. ch. 265, § 43(b) (1996). The statute reads in part as follows: "No

sentence imposed under the provisions of this subsection shall be less than a mandatory
minimum term of imprisonment of one year." Id.
"s MASS. GEN. L. ch. 265, § 43(c) (1996).
..MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 6 (1996). The statute reads in part as follows:
Whenever any law officer has reason to believe that a family or household
member has been abused or is in danger of being abused, such officer shall
(4) give such person immediate and adequate notice of his or her rights.
Such notice shall consist of handing said person a copy of the statement
which follows below and reading the same to said person. Where said
person's native language is not English, the statement shall be then
provided in said person's native language whenever possible.
'You have the right to appear at the Superior, Probate and Family, District
or Boston Municipal Court, if you reside within the appropriate jurisdiction,
and file a complaint requesting any of the following applicable orders: (a)
an order restraining your attacker from abusing you; (b) an order directing
your attacker to leave your household, building or workplace; (c) an order
awarding you custody of a minor child; (d) an order directing your attacker
to pay support for you or any minor child in your custody, if the attacker has
a legal obligation of support; and (e) an order directing your attacker to pay
you for losses suffered as a result of abuse, including medical and moving
expenses, loss of earnings or support, costs for restoring utilities and
replacing locks, reasonable attorney's fees and other out-of-pocket losses for
injuries and property damage sustained.
Id.
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restrictions with any explanatory information. 17
Approximately seventeen percent of defendants served with protective
orders violate the order within one year of the order's issuance."' An
information sheet given to each defendant served with a 209A order would serve
to educate them as to their duties and responsibilities under the order while
mitigating the confusion and anger that accompanies receipt of such notice.' 9
The information sheet should explain what a protective order is, how it limits the
defendant's conduct, and the applicable penalties for violating the order. 20
Additionally, the sheet should be given to all defendants when they are served
with process or mailed to each defendant after the filing of the 209A order with
the court. This additional educational information will help to prevent future
violations.
III. CONCLUSION
While Massachusetts was unfortunately the first state to adopt the marital
rape exemption in 1857, the Commonwealth was also one of the first states to
adopt progressive abuse prevention measures. Massachusetts has steadily
enhanced victim protection through. the abolishment of the marital rape
exemption and enactment of both the Massachusetts Abuse Prevention Statute
and the Stalking Statute. The legislature has also adopted amendments
providing for full faith and credit for extraterritorial protective orders. The
Massachusetts legislature should continue this trend by amending the Abuse
Prevention Act. Such an amendment should include mandatory dissemination
of information regarding a 209A order's provisions and restrictions in an effort
to decrease the frequency of protective order violations.
EstherM Bixier

117 See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 209A, § 7 (1996) (noting violation of protective
order is
criminal offense).

" See ADAMS & PoWELL, supra note 1, at 2 (finding 17.3% of defendants violate

protective order within one year).
"' See attached information sheet originally created by Attorney Stephen Russo, 33
Vernon Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02108, and modified with the assistance of Assistant
District Attorney John P. Zanini, Suffolk County District Attorney's Office, in accordance
with his own opinions and understanding. The proposed information sheet should not be
regarded as having the imprimatur of the District Attorney for the Suffolk District.
,2o See attached information sheet.
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ANSWERS TO DEFENDANT'S QUESTIONS ABOUT 209A RESTRAINING
ORDERS
The information provided is intended to answer some common questions you may have
about your order. If you need legal advice, you must consult an attorney.
WHAT IS A 209A RESTRAINING
ORDER?
The court has issued a restraining order
against you pursuant to Massachusetts
General Laws chapter 209A (The
Massachusetts Abuse Prevention Law). This
law enables a family or household member
suffering from abuse to file a complaint
requesting court protection against physical
harm or attempted physical harm, fear of
physical harm, or sexual relations.

and can be extended by the court. Only the
plaintiff can ask the court to shorten the time
period. Do not assume or believe this order
has been terminated unless you get an order
from the court saying that the order has been
terminated. If the plaintiff tells you that the
order has ended, and this is not true, you can
be arrested and punished for a violation of the
order if you contact the plaintiff.

The 209A Order means that the court has
found that there is a substantial likelihood of
immediate danger or abuse to the individual
who filed the 209A complaint against you
[hereinafter "plainiff"].

Unless the court has changed the order you
must comply even if you think the plaintiff
has changed his/her mind or you think you
have the plaintiffs permission. If a violation
occurs, the court will focus on YOUR
behavior, not the plaintiffs. YOU will be held
responsible for your own behavior.

In order to protect the plaintiff, the court has
ordered you:
o NOT TO ABUSE THE VICTIM;
o NOT TO CONTACT THE VICTIM;
o TO STAY AWAY FROM THE VICTIM;
o TO STAY AWAY FROM THE
VICTIM'S WORK PLACE;
[ TO STAY AWAY FROM THE
PLAINTIFF'S MINOR CHILDREN; AND
o TO VACATE THE HOUSEHOLD.

WHAT DOES NO CONTACT MEAN?
The no contact order includes ANY FORM of
direct and indirect contact. You cannot call,
write, approach, or follow the plaintiff or have
someone else call, write, approach, or follow
that person for you. You can not send the
victim flowers or cards, anonymously, or
otherwise. You can not leave messages on
the plaintiff's answering machine, voice mail,
or send the plaintiff E-mail.

ABUSE IS A CRIMINAL ACT, but the
restraining order is a civil order, not a criminal
order. This means that you do not have a
criminal record as a result of the order.
However, violation of the order can result in
arrest, criminal charges, and a criminal record.

You cannot have the plaintiff served with
legal papers unless the order specifically
allows service of process.

IT IS IN YOUR BEST INTEREST TO
UNDERSTAND WHAT THE ORDER
MEANS, WHAT YOU MUST DO OR NOT
DO TO COMPLY WITH THE ORDER,
AND WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO YOU IF
YOU VIOLATE THE ORDER.
HOW LONG DOES THE ORDER
LAST?
The 209A Order is in effect up to one year

WHAT ABOUT MY PERSONAL
BELONGINGS?
If you have been ordered to leave and stay
away from the plaintiff's residence and
belongings are left behind, you must get court
permission to pick up the belongings and
must contact the police to accompany you. If
you have a dispute with the plaintiff over the
belongings, you must go to court to resolve
the dispute.
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CAN I CALL OR VISIT MY
CHILDREN?
If you have been ordered not to contact your
children and to surrender custody of them to
the plaintiff, you cannot call or visit them.
You must go to Probate and Family Court to
get permission to visit them.
If you obtain an order allowing visitation
rights and a prior order prohibiting contact
with the plaintiff is still in effect, you must
make arrangements with a third party to see
the children. You should also carry a copy of
both orders with you to avoid being arrested.
WHAT IF THE PLAINTIFF
CONTACTS ME?
The 209A order governs YOUR behavior, not
the plaintiffs. If the plaintiff contacts you,
you are still subject to the court's order and are
prohibited from contact. If the plaintiff
harasses, threatens, or intimidates you, you
may seek a protective order from the district
court or call the police.
If you are in a public place and the plaintiff
walks in, YOU must leave. It doesn't matter
who was there first.

WHAT ELSE CAN'T I DO?
You cannot keep keys to the plaintiffs
residence, damage the plaintiffs belongings,
cause to be shut off the plaintiffs utilities,
discontinue the plaintiffs mail service,
trespass on the plaintiffs residence or
workplace, or drive/walk past the plaintiffs
residence. Additionally, you may not
drive/walk past the plaintiff's workplace when
the plaintiff is at work.
The order may also contain additional terms
that apply to you. Understand all the terms of
the order. You will not be able to claim
ignorance as a defense if you violate the order.
WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF I VIOLATE
THE ORDER?
VIOLATION OF THE RESTRAINING
ORDER IS A CRIME punishable by 2 '/2
years in prison or a $5,000.00 fine, or both.

Violation can result in arrest, criminal
charges, and a criminal record.
It is mandatory for a police officer to arrest a
suspect whenever that officer has probable
cause to believe that the suspect has violated a
restraining order. If you are arrested, you will
be charged with the criminal offense of
violating the order.
You may also be subject to additional criminal
charges such as assault and battery, threats,
harassment, trespassing, and stalking.
Stalking is harassment or repeated following
of another person. Stalking in violation of a
court order, including a restraining order,
carries a mandatory minimum penalty of one
year in the House of Correction and a
maximum of five years in State Prison.
HOW DO I COMPLY WITH THE 209A
ORDER?
Whether or not you agree with the order, you
are legally required to obey it. As long as your
order is in effect, you must respect it. Do not
try to take matters into your own hands.
Accept the legal process as the only way to
resolve a dispute concerning the order and
consult an attorney if you need legal advice.
Make sure you understand what your order
says. The Court expects you to know and
understand all of its contents. If you violate
part of an order, you will not be able to defend
yourself by claiming you forgot that part or
did not realize it was included in the order.
Remember, a 209A order is not a criminal
conviction, but VIOLATION OF THE
ORDER IS A IS A CRIMINAL ACT AND
CAN LEAD TO ARREST, CONVICTION,
AND IMPRISONMENT. IF YOU NEED
HELP IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH
THE ORDER, GET IT AND HELP
YOURSELF AVOID THE CRIMINAL
CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLATING THE
ORDER. Consider a certified batterer's
program, alcohol/drug counseling, or both.

